

八十四學年度 哲學 所 組 碩士班研究生入學考試

科目 倫理學 科號 4305 共 3 頁第 1 頁 *請在試卷【答案卷】內作答

三題全卷，每題各佔 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ %

一、柏拉圖理想國第二書中，Glaucon提出牧羊人蓋吉思(Gyges)的故事，來詰問蘇格拉底「人為什麼要得過道德的生活？」蓋吉思在地震中，發現了一枚神奇的戒指，可以讓他人形消失，自由行動而不被查覺。Glaucon說不管是有德或無德之人，有了蓋吉思的戒指之後，都一定會為所欲為，不再受道德拘束。若真如此，這又有什麼不對呢？有了這枚神奇的戒指，做壞事不會被逮到，到底還有什麼理由，可以讓人繼續維持道德？

1. 在理想國一書中，柏拉圖如何回答Glaucon的詰問？試以柏拉圖的回答，說明古代（希臘）倫理學對回答「人為什麼得過道德生活？」此問題的一些基本假設。
2. 在回答「人為什麼要道德？」此問題上，古代倫理學和現代倫理學（如：康德、功利主義）採取很不同的方向。請說明其中的不同，並分析個別的優劣。
3. 基於你上面的分析，你自己對「人為什麼得過道德生活？」此問題，有何看法？請說明理由。

二、請考慮下面的倫理立場：「首先，讓我們假設有所謂正義的戰爭，也就是說，在某些情況下，我們可以合理地使用大規模的暴力，來對付邪惡。戰爭縱然是一種暴力行徑，但若是為正義的理由，非打不可，也必須遵守戰爭應有的道德規範。當然，面對侵略國，我們的目的是打贏這場仗、來伸張正義，但是有一些事，不管如何，是不能做的（如：轟炸敵國的人民居住區、刑求戰犯以獲得機要情報）。即使這些行動可以讓我們在短時間內有效地制服侵略國，我們都不能做。」

在倫理學裡，這個立場，算是主張有所謂的「道義上的限制」(deontological constraints)：在某些時候，我們有理由不去做對整體效果會最好的事。

1. 這個立場和功利主義，有何不同？功利主義者，是否有可能也會替戰爭定下一些道德規範？若有可能，他們定出的道德規範，和上述立場，在內容、理由上，會有什麼不同？請舉例、並詳加說明。
2. 「道義上的限制」背後有什麼道理？我們有什麼理由，接受上述的立場？請盡量闡釋「道義上限制」背後的成立理由。
3. 對上述的立場，可能最有力的批評，會是什麼？以你的意見，上述的倫理立場站得住腳嗎？請說明理由。

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三、在道德教育的討論中，「指導性的道德教育」(directive moral education)主張對未成年人，父母、老師應以獎勵訓誡、以身作則的方式，直接傳授一些道德原則、並培養他們一些好的道德習慣（如：自律、勇敢、誠實）。反對派（如：發展心理學家Kohlberg）則強調：道德的發展和知性的發展息息相關，隨著知性的啟發，人自然會具有該階段的道德推理能力，若強加傳授、訓誡，不但沒用，還會阻礙他們自主性的養成。贊成者則力辯：指導性的道德教育，不但不會阻礙自主性，還能促成自主性的養成。有關「指導性道德教育不會阻礙自主性」的部份論證如下：

"Unlike children, mature adults often do seem to respond to moral reasons. But why should the previous application of directive techniques be thought to prevent this? It is true that directive techniques use nonrational means to produce desires and character traits that will eventually influence one's adult actions. However, even if an adult is motivated by a desire that was originally produced by nonrational means, it still seems possible for his action to be done for good moral reasons. In particular, this still seems possible if his nonrationally produced desire is precisely to act *in accordance with* such reasons. But it is surely just this desire which the sensitive practitioner of directive moral education seeks to instill.

If moral autonomy required only action in accordance with moral reasons, this response would be decisive. However, another strain of thought construes the requirements for autonomy more strictly. On this view, genuine moral autonomy requires not only that an agent act *in accordance with* moral reasons, but also that he *be motivated* by his awareness of them. In Kantian terms, the autonomous agent must be "self-legislating." On this expanded account the effectiveness of a past directive education may again seem threatening to current autonomy. If without his past directive education the agent would not now act as he does, then it is apparently just the desires produced by that education which supply the motivational energy for his current act. But if so, that motivational

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energy is evidently not supplied by his recognition of reasons themselves. His recognition of reasons may *trigger* the motivational energy for his act; but what is triggered is still energy with an independent source. Hence, the requirements for moral autonomy still seem unsatisfied.

With this refinement, we approach the heart of the objection that directive moral education violates autonomy. But although the refinement is familiar, the resulting argument is problematic. Most obviously, it rests on both the obscure metaphor of motivational energy and the undefended requirement that autonomous acts must draw such energy from reasons themselves. But the difficulty goes deeper. Even if its premises were both intelligible and defensible, the argument would be a non sequitur. Although it purports to demonstrate that directive moral education *violates* moral autonomy, it really shows only that such education does not *contribute* to moral autonomy. Far from establishing that directive techniques are pernicious, it at best establishes that they are morally neutral."

請將上述論證，加以重整、分析、並加以評估。