

告子的義外說與自然科學的精神

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先秦時代的哲學思想，如荀子的制天說，如告子的義外說，均頗富有自然科學的精神，足為自然科學發展的基礎。荀子的制天說雖有專論傳流於後世，惜未為後世所重視。至於告子的義外說，則僅見於與孟子的辯論中，寥寥數語，其詳不可得而知。諸般學問莫不出自哲學思想的孕育，哲學思想掌握着諸般學問發展的趨向。哲學思想重視某一對象，則凡懷抱此一哲學思想的人，必集中全力以研究此一對象，日積月累，逐漸發展以成燦爛的學問。哲學思想不重視某一對象，則凡懷抱此一哲學思想的人，必視此一對象為沒有研究的價值，不屑從事研究，有關此一對象的學問便不易興起，更談不到發展了。由此說來，中國自然科學之不發展，荀子制天說的為後世所忽視，告子義外說的未能發展流傳，實有其重大影響。荀子的制天說置重於實用；告子的義外說，依據孟子中的簡單紀錄，似乎出自純理的觀點。實用固足以促進理論的發展，究不若出自純理觀點之與理論發展更為切近，則告子義外說的未能發展流傳，益為一件可惜的事情了。

告子與孟子同時，在人性善惡問題上，在義內義外問題上，持論都與孟子不同。孟子不惜與他當面辯論這些問題，令人想見，告子的學說，在當時的思想界，一定具有相當的勢力。如孟季子，以“何以謂義內也”質詢公都子，殆亦支持告子的義外說而為告子學派的一人。孟子說：“告子先我不動心”（孟子“公孫丑”上），又足令人想見，告子是一位頗有修養的人。

告子義外說的要點見於告子與孟子的辯論中，茲將該辯論中告子所說的全文引錄如下：

告子曰：“食色、性也。仁、內也，非外也；義、外也，非內也……彼長而我長之，非有長於我也，猶彼白而我白之，從其白於外也，故謂之外也……吾弟則愛之，秦人之弟則不愛也，是以我為悅者也，故謂之內。長楚人之長，

亦長吾之長，是以長為悅者也，故謂之外也。”（孟子“告子”上）

前撰孟子的義內說與告子的義外說一文（考試院學術講演會講解，載考銓月刊第六十期），分析兩家所說義字及內外二字的意義，以覘兩家所說是否真正相反。分析結果，發見兩家所說義字，其名雖同，其義實異，故雖一方主張義內，他方主張義外，亦祇是形似的相反，不是真正的相反。“從其白於外也”與“是以長為悅者也”二語，是告子義外說的骨幹，是探索義外說真義的主要線索。前文即依此二語，推定告子所說的義是把事實認識得正與事實相符，簡言之，即是如實的認識。物體是白的，我認識其為白，這纔是如實的認識，纔是正知。物體是白的，我認識其為灰，便成了不如實的認識，便成了邪知。事實認識之為正為邪，其決定權操於所認識的客體，不得由能認識的主體依一己的好惡以為轉移，不得因為喜歡白而強認灰者為白，亦不得因為不喜歡白而強認白者為灰。告子所說的內外，分指能認識的主體與所認識的客體。“義，外也，非內也”，意即認識的正邪決於所認識的客體，不是決於能認識的主體。前文所推定者，略如上述。使此一推定而尚無不當，則告子的義外說確與自然科學的精神甚相吻合，足為自然科學發展的基礎。

自然科學是事實的科學，是客觀的科學。自然科學的研究目的，在於獲知客觀事實的真相；為了達成此一目的，採用客觀的研究方法，注重觀察，尤注重實驗。觀察所得，難免還夾雜些主觀的成分。故凡可以採用實驗方法的，一定用實驗方法來研究，沒法採用實驗方法的，纔用觀察方法來研究。自然科學家中，有人描述實驗方法，謂其具有“向自然提出質詢，迫其自作答覆”的功用。自然現象無知無識，不會故意說謊，且設計了各種條件加以箝制，亦不容其不吐露真情。所以自然現象自己所作的答覆最為確實可信。自然科學所欲獲知的是事實的真相，故對於事實本身，絕對尊重，絕對服從，不敢稍稍染上主觀的色彩。告子的“從其白於外也”與“是以長為悅者也”，意即要想知道物體真正的顏色，必須服從物體本身所具的顏色，要想辨認生物真正的長幼，必須以生物本身的長幼，為決定因素。擴而充之，亦即認識事實，必須服從事實本身，必須以事實本身為認識正誤的判別標準。告子此一主張，正合於自然科學的目的與方法，故可謂為具有自然科學的精神。

自然科學的基本態度，祇問真偽，不問善惡。其學說的取舍，完全以真偽為標準，真者取之，偽者舍之，不為善惡所影響，不依善惡定從違，不因其惡而強認其為偽，亦不因其善而幻想其為真。例如肺病患者吐痰之足以傳佈病菌，其事誠惡，但自然科學必須依據事實上之是否傳播以決定此事的真偽，決不能因其惡而強認其為虛妄。又如術士自稱能藉符咒以治愈任何疾病，其事誠善，但在自然科學，必須依據其確能治愈與否以決定其所稱的真偽，不能因其善而遽信其為真實。善惡問題確甚重要，自然科學當然不會菲薄善惡而視為不足道，不過自然科學把善惡視為其職責範圍以外的問題。自然科學的目的在於致真，祇要能夠致真，其任務便已算圓滿達成了。告子的義外說亦正發揮了同樣的觀點。告子義外說之所以異於孟子的義內說，如前文所分析，因為告子所說的義是理智性的義，取決於所認識的客體，以致真為任務，孟子所說的義是情意的義，取決於能認識的主體，以致善為任務。“義·外也”，其所直接表示的，是義否取決於客體，其所間接表示的，是純以考定真偽為任務。“非內也”，其所直接表示的，是義否不取決於主體，其所間接表示的，是不以衡定善惡為任務。告子此一主張正合於自然科學的基本態度，故又可謂具有自然科學的精神。

自然科學之所以把致真定為唯一的職務而不欲涉及善惡問題，固有鑒於分工研究之足以益趨精邃，亦有鑒於涉及善惡之足以妨礙其應盡的職責。自然科學在從事研究時，應當採取極公平極客觀的態度，對於其研究範圍以內的現象，一視同仁，絲毫無所軒輊。若涉及善惡問題，情意上便不免有所好惡。情意上一有好惡，便會掩蔽理智的清明，阻塞思慮的周到。人們遇到一件惡事，往往深惡痛絕，不願意相信其為事實。連其存在的權利都想予以剝奪，如何還能保持態度的公平與客觀？例如有一肺病患者隨地吐痰，傍人告以此一舉動足以傳播病菌而有害於人；必此一患者確為富有修養勇於服善的人，纔肯自認此一舉動之為罪過，否則勢且否認吐痰傳播的真實性，或雖不否認傳播的可能，亦且不肯承認偶一吐痰之竟能使他人恰巧傳上。理智是容易趨於混濁的，思慮是容易趨於疏漏的，為之儘量佈置有利的環境，尚難期其永保清明與周到，若任其暴露於不利的影響之中，清明與周到更難望其保持了。

所以自然科學在研究時，祇好把善惡問題割棄，而專心壹意於真偽的探討，庶幾可以無虧於職責。

說到自然科學的職責在於致真而不在於致善，自不免觸及一個基本問題：真善的同異究屬如何？真善是一致的，還是不定一致的？真與善若是一致的，真者必善，善者必真，則致真即是致善，無可分別。真與善若不定一致，真者非必善，善者非必真，則致真與致善是兩件不同的事情，不可混為一談。前撰真偽與善惡一文（見大陸雜誌第十卷第二期），說明真善一致說之難於成立及真善別異說之方合事實真相。該文闡述已詳，茲不贅說。真善的不定一致，其例甚多，其事甚明，主張真善一致說者亦不能完全抹煞此事實，於是為了維持其學說，不免抑善從真或抑真從善。中國古來的哲學思想大抵一方面主張真善一致說，他方面雖不蔑視真，但其重視的程度，比之於善的重視，究屬稍遜一籌。結果所屈，遂不免有抑真從善的傾向。一經抑真從善，縱不否認一切惡事現象上的存在，亦不免否認其本質上的實在。對於善事，則一一為之染上真的色彩，即使在現象上無從見其存在的，亦必力主其本質上的實在。於是真偽便不免有混淆之虞了。既合真善為一，又重善甚於重真，於是所謂真者，其範圍不免因而減縮，與實際上的真不能完全符合了。中國古來的哲學思想中，雖未嘗沒有“絕聖棄智”的主張，但大多數是重視知識的，如中庸以知列為三達德之一，可見其非常重視。不過其所重視的，大抵偏於善惡方面的知，雖亦時常注意到真偽方面的知，但試探索其所以知，還是為了善惡，而不是為了真偽；真偽的知不免居於附庸的地位。自真善一致說看來，真偽的知即是善惡的知，固屬無可分別。自真善別異說看來，兩者不是盡同的。善惡的知是價值科學的基礎，真偽的知是事實科學的基礎。必真偽的知與善惡的知並重，而後事實科學纔能與價值科學平流並進。偏重了善惡的知，固大有助於價值科學的發展，却無以刺激事實科學的興起。中國自然科學之不發達，哲學思想之偏重善惡的知而忽視真偽的知，不失為一個重大的關鍵。告子固未嘗明言真善別異，亦未嘗明言真善並重，但自其仁內義外的主張推之，可想見其懷抱着如此的見解。告子把仁與義分為兩事，其特色各不相同。仁的特色“內也，非外也”，義的特色“外也，非內也”，在“內也”“外也”的特

色上，仁與義正相反對。如上所述，“義，外也，非內也”，意即義否的決定權操於所認識的客體，不操於能認識的主體，故義以致真為任務。準此推論，“仁，內也，非外也”，意即仁否的決定權操於能認識的主體，不操於所認識的客體，故以致善為任務。“是以我為悅者也”明示仁否之取決於主體；“吾弟則愛之”，以愛釋仁，亦明示仁之屬於善惡範疇。告子把仁與義分為不同的兩事，豈非已承認了真善的別異？仁與義有無輕重之別？關於此點，告子未有所論列。但觀其仁與義相提並論，且各賦以不同的特色，各還以本來的面目，可想見其不會懷有抑善從真或抑真從善的傾向。既不懷有抑此從彼的傾向，不妨推定其為真善並重。故告子的仁內義外說，對於價值科學與事實科學，可謂供給了平等發展的基礎。告子的仁內說亦為其他學者所主張，告子的義外說纔是其獨特的見解，故最足以顯示告子學說特色的，不得不推其義外說。至就自然科學而論，欲促進自然科學的發展，必須培養自然科學的精神，欲培養自然科學的精神，告子的義外說實有其不可忽視的價值。

告子的性無善無不善論，似與其義外說有着密切的關係。人性原可以作多方面的研究，可着眼於其價值上的善惡，亦可着眼於其事實上的性質。

告子曰：“生之謂性。”（孟子“告子”上）

告子曰：“性猶湍水也，決諸東方則東流，決諸西方則西流。人性之無分於善不善也，猶水之無分於東西也。”（孟子“告子”上）

“生之謂性”可說是告子關於性的定義，意即性是人類生來所固具的。依此定義，告子是把性視作一種自然現象。既把性視作自然現象，則以自然科學純客觀的眼光來觀察人性，自屬當然。自然界的事物，就其本身而論，祇具有事實上的性質，不具有價值上的性質。事物而能發生有利於人的作用，人始賦以積極的價值而稱之為善，事物而發生有害於人的作用，人便賦以消極的價值而稱之為惡。善惡是人所賦予的，是主觀的，不是事物所固具的，不是客觀的。把人性視作自然現象，人性亦與自然界中其他的事物相同，其本身不具有任何價值，沒有什麼善惡之可言。告子的義外說，主張義否完全取決於所認識的客體，不令主觀的成分滲雜其間。人性本身既無善無惡，依照義外說的指示以觀察人性，自不能發見其為善，亦不能發見其為

惡，唯有出於承認“人性之無分於善不善也”的一途了。我們若把義外說稱為告子知識論或方法論上的基本原則，則告子的性無善無不善論可謂已被其知識論或方法論的理論注定了命運，不能更作其他的主張。告子關於性的另一理論，謂“食、色、性也”，僅舉食與色而不及其他，可想見告子視食與色為性的基本。近世生物學家謂生物的特徵在於維持生命與延續生命，告子所說正與相符。觀於此點，亦足令人想像，告子的義外說是有助於自然科學的發展的。

KAOTZE'S VIEW OF RIGHTEOUSNESS BEING EXTERNAL
AND THE SPIRIT OF NATURAL SCIENCES*

CHEN TA-TSI

The philosophical thought of the pre-Ch'in period as embodied in Hsüntze's argument concerning the controllability of Heaven and in Kaotze's view of righteousness being external was much pregnant with the spirit of natural sciences. Indeed, it could have served as a basis for the development of natural sciences. The special treatise in which Hsüntze propounded that man may control Heaven—by Heaven is meant Nature—has come down to us through the centuries; unfortunately, however, this theory of his was not sufficiently emphasized and elaborated by later generations. As to Kaotze's assertion that righteousness is external and not internal, it was only recorded in a few sentences as part of his argument with Mencius, and no details are now available.

Now, all branches of learning have started from, and grown out of, philosophic speculation. Philosophic speculation of any given period determines in a large measure the tendency and development of the different branches of learning. In other words, when philosophical thought pays great attention to a certain object or problem those who hold such philosophical thought naturally concentrate their study on that object or problem. In due course of time and with accumulated knowledge, a special discipline, a particular branch of learning, takes shape. On the other hand, if a certain object or problem does not receive due attention from the prevalent philosophical thought of the age it is deemed unworthy of serious study; consequently not much progress along the line can be expected. From this it may be said that back of the fact that natural sciences were not developed in China, the overlooking and neglect by succeeding generations of Hsüntze's argument concerning the controllability of Heaven and of Kaotze's view of righteousness being external had an immense, far-reaching effect.

Hsüntze's theme laid stress on practical utility. Kaotze's assertion as recorded in a scanty passage in *The Works of Mencius* came apparently from

*This article by Chancellor Chen is originally written and published above in Chinese. As we deem it also of unusual interest to Western scholars, a complete translation rather than a short abstract is preferable here. And in compliance with our request, Prof. Dison Hsueh-feng Poe has kindly rendered into English the whole text.—The Editorial Board

pure reasoning. Practical utility, of course, may also promote the development of theories both philosophical and scientific. But nothing is more conducive to such development than pure reasoning. Thus, it is the more regrettable that Kaotze's idea of righteousness being external was not widely circulated and fully developed.

Kaotze was a contemporary of Mencius. The two differed in their views as to whether human nature is good or evil and whether righteousness is internal or external. That Mencius cared to have argued face to face with Kaotze indicated that the latter's ideas must have been of considerable influence in the then thinking world. For instance, Mengchitze once asked Kungtotze, "What is meant by saying that righteousness is internal?" Most likely, Mengchitze was one of Kaotze's followers, believing righteousness to be external. Moreover, Mencius remarked thus: "Kaotze had attained to an unperturbed mind at an earlier period of life than I did." (*Kungsun Chow*, Part 1, *The Works of Mencius*.) One may infer from this acknowledgment that Kaotze must have been at the same time a man of strong, refined character.

As is indicated above, the gist of Kaotze's view that righteousness is external is found in his discussion with Mencius. Here is the whole relevant passage:*

"Kaotze said: 'To desire for food and sex is human nature. Benevolence is internal and not external; righteousness is external and not internal. . . . There is a man older than I, and I give honor to his age. It is not that there is first in me a principle of such reverence to age. It is just as when there is a white man, and I take him to be white;—according as he is white externally to me. On this account, I pronounce of righteousness that it is external. . . . There is my younger brother;—I love him. But the younger brother of a man of Ch'in I do not love: that is, the feeling is determined by myself, and therefore I say that benevolence is internal. On the other hand, I give honor to an old man of Ts'oo, and I also give honor to an old man of my own people: that is, the feeling is determined by the age, and therefore I say that righteousness is external.'" (*Kaotze*, Part 1, *The Works of Mencius*.)

While Kaotze held that righteousness is external Mencius believed that it is internal. In a previous article of mine, *Mencius's View of Righteousness being Internal and Kaotze's View of Righteousness being External* (published in the

*In quoting from *The Works of Mencius*, I have followed Legge's translation, with a few alterations. It may be added here that, in rendering this article into English, I have attempted at a faithful, but not literal, translation, and that almost all original paragraphs have been broken up into much shorter ones.—Translator

Examination and Registration Monthly, April, 1956), inquiry was made through an analysis of terms as to whether their contradiction is real or apparent. It was pointed out there that upon close scrutiny the matter is one of semantics and that the contradiction is more apparent than real. True, Mencius and Kaotze employed the same words, "righteousness", "internal", and "external". But the meanings which they attached to these words differed.

So far as Kaotze's view is concerned, its main structure is revealed in the two statements already quoted. "And I take him to be white;—according as he is white externally to me." "I give honor to an old man of Ts'oo, and also give honor to an old man of my own people: that is, the feeling is determined by the age." These two statements of Kaotze give us a clue to understanding his view. To Kaotze, what was meant by righteousness is this: what is recognized of the matter corresponds with the property of the matter. Briefly put, righteousness is true-to-fact recognition. Here is something white in color, and I recognize it as white. This is true-to-fact recognition; this is true knowledge. Here is something white in color, and I recognize it as gray. This is untrue-to-fact recognition; this is false knowledge. So, as regards whether any recognition is true or false, the determining factor lies in the object that is being recognized, and not in the subject that does the recognizing. Personal whims, personal likings and dislikings of the subject, cannot in the least determine the truth or falsehood of any recognition. Nobody should recognize something gray to be something white simply because he likes white color; nor should one recognize something white to be something gray just because he dislikes white color.

By describing as "internal" and "external", Kaotze meant to differentiate respectively the subject person that does the recognizing and the object matter that is being recognized. The statement that "righteousness is external and not internal" means that whether recognition is true or false is to be determined by the object being recognized and not by the subject doing the recognizing. Such was my conclusion in another article mentioned above. If this interpretation is not far from being correct, it may well be asserted that Kaotze's view of righteousness being external coincides with the spirit of natural sciences and that it could have served as a basis for the development of natural sciences.

Natural sciences are empirical sciences, factual and objective. Their aim is to find out the true nature of connected facts. In order to reach the aim, objective methods of study are employed: namely, observation and experimentation. Among these two methods, particular emphasis is put on experimentation. This is because the result of objective observation may still be alloy-

ed with subjective elements. So, wherever possible, experimentation is employed in natural sciences as the proper method of study. And only where experimentation remains inapplicable is observation resorted to. One famous natural scientist likened experimentation to putting questions to nature and compelling her to yield answers. As all natural phenomena are unconscious and therefore cannot tell lies, they cannot but—through repeated experiments under well planned conditions and controls—reveal their innermost secrets. Indeed, the self-given answers obtained through experimentation are most trustworthy.

Natural sciences attempt to discover the true nature of connected facts. To facts, therefore, natural sciences pay absolute respect and give unconditional acceptance; and not the least tincture of subjectivity is allowed. "According as he is white externally to me;" and "the feeling is determined by the age;"—these remarks of Kaotze mean this: to know the color of a physical object is to accept the color it actually bears, and to differentiate the respective ages of living bodies is to accept their actual age as the determining factor. Logically it follows that to recognize a fact is to accept a fact, and that the only dependable standard with which to judge whether certain recognition is true or false is no other than certain fact itself. This central idea of Kaotze fits perfectly well with the objective and methodology of natural sciences and may therefore be said to contain the spirit of natural sciences.

The fundamental attitude of natural sciences in regard to things in general is to ascertain whether they are true or false, not whether they are good or evil. In adopting or discarding certain theories, natural sciences go by one standard, and one standard only: that is, whether these theories are true or false. True theories are adopted, and false ones discarded. No consideration is given as to whether they are good or evil. Natural sciences do not pronounce certain theories false because they appear to be evil; nor do they imagine certain other theories true because they seem good.

Take a trivial instance. Here is a tuberculosis patient, spitting at random and thus spreading the disease germs. This is looked upon as something evil, indeed. However, in the eyes of natural sciences, the only question is whether it is true that tuberculosis is spread through random spitting. That it is true cannot be denied merely because it is evil. Again, here is a necromancer claiming to be able to cure any and all kinds of sickness by writing charms and reciting incantations. This appears to be something good. But, according to natural sciences, the question remains to be whether or not what is claimed can be proved to be a fact. It should not be taken as true simply

because, if true, it would be good.

Indeed, the problem of good and evil is a problem of great importance. And natural sciences do not in the least ignore or belittle such a problem. Such a problem, however, lies outside their domain. The aim of natural sciences is to seek after truth. When truth is bit by bit discovered their task is being performed. This is exactly the viewpoint implied by Kaotze in his assertion that righteousness is external. Mencius, on the other hand, held that righteousness is internal. To Kaotze, righteousness is something of intellectual nature, is determined by the object matter being recognized, and serves to attain truth. To Mencius, righteousness is something of sentimental nature, is determined by the subject person doing the recognizing, and serves to attain goodness. Kaotze's assertion that "righteousness is external" has a twofold implication. Directly, it means that whether or no something is righteous is to be determined by the object matter; and indirectly, it means that the function involved is to determine whether that something is true or false. Likewise, Kaotze's next assertion that righteousness "is not internal" also has a twofold significance. Directly, it means that whether or no something is righteous is not to be determined by the subject person; and indirectly, it means that the function involved is not to evaluate whether that something is good or evil. Here again, Kaotze's position agrees completely with the fundamental attitude of natural sciences and may therefore be said to possess the spirit of natural sciences.

There is a good deal of reason why natural sciences confine their task to the seeking after truth and refuse to meddle in the problem of good and evil. For one thing, fruitfulness and perfection can best be acquired through division of labor. What is more, the bringing in of the problem of good and evil hinders natural sciences from performing their primary task, that of seeking after truth. Let it be noted that throughout their process of study natural sciences must maintain an attitude of complete fairness and perfect objectivity. All phenomena under their scrutiny are to be accorded equal treatment; there is to be no preference, no favoritism. The minute the question of good and evil is brought in, subjective elements of personal likings and dislikings creep up at once, thereby blurring a clear intellect and blocking a thorough analysis. Oftentimes when people are confronted with something that is considered evil they have such an aversion that they are unwilling even to admit it to be a fact. Since people would go so far as to deny the very existence of a fact, how could they maintain an attitude of utmost fairness and perfect objectivity?

To continue the illustration: Here is a tuberculosis patient going round

and spitting at random, and somebody tells him that such action spreads the disease and is harmful to others. Only if the patient is a man of sufficiently high intellect and strong character will he readily admit his action to be faulty. Otherwise, he would very likely deny that tuberculosis can be spread through spitting. At least he will argue that his random spitting will not in each and every case actually spread the disease to some one else.

It is altogether easy for one's intellect to become blurred and for one's analysis to remain incomplete. Even under best planned and most favorable conditions, it is difficult to have one's intellect always clear and one's analysis always thorough. Under unfavorable conditions—such as to let enter the elements of personal likings and dislikings—it is the more difficult to maintain a clear intellect and make a thorough analysis. It follows from what is said above that throughout their course of study natural sciences cannot but drop out the problem of good and evil, and can only whole-heartedly devote themselves to the problem of truth and falsehood so that their primary task of seeking after truth may be performed with success.

To state that the function and duty of natural sciences is to seek after truth and not to seek after goodness, unavoidably brings up one fundamental question: What is the similarity or difference between truth and goodness? Are truth and goodness always identical? Or, are they not necessarily identical? If they are always identical, then what is true must be good, and what is good must be true. In such a case, seeking after truth is *ipso facto* seeking after goodness. If, on the other hand, they are not necessarily identical, then what is true may not be good, and what is good may not be true. In such a case, seeking after truth and seeking after goodness are separate and different, and cannot be taken to mean one and the same thing.

In a special article of mine devoted to the study of this problem (*Truth vs. Falsehood and Good vs. Evil*, published in the *Continent Magazine*, Vol. X, No. 2, January, 1955), it is pointed out at some length that, as regards the relationship between truth and goodness, the theory of identity hardly holds water whereas the theory of differentiation corresponds with actual facts. As my views are elaborated there they need not be reiterated here. Suffice it to say, many self-evident illustrations may be given how truth and goodness are not necessarily identical. As a matter of fact, the lack of necessary identity could not be denied even by those who championed the identity theory. And in order to maintain their theory, they had to resort to either sacrificing truth for goodness or sacrificing goodness for truth.

In the main, traditional Chinese philosophical thought was inclined, on the one hand, to hold truth and goodness to be identical and, on the other,

to attach more importance to goodness than to truth. As a consequence, there was an unmistakable tendency to espouse goodness at the expense of truth. Such being the case, far-reaching philosophical implications resulted. Regarding what was considered to be evil, its substantive reality—its truth—was denied even though its phenomenal occurrence was admitted. Regarding what was considered to be good, every effort was made to clothe it with the color of truth; even though there was no assurance of its possible phenomenal occurrence its substantive reality was vehemently assumed. The total outcome is that there is much danger of having truth and goodness mixed up. It can be readily seen that, by preferring goodness to truth over above identifying truth with goodness, the scope of what is apprehended as truth is necessarily narrowed and cannot coincide with what is truth in its entirety.

Among ancient Chinese philosophers a very few did hold that "wisdom and knowledge should be done away with." But the overwhelming majority emphasized the importance of knowledge. In the *Doctrine of the Mean*, for instance, knowledge was listed as the first of three universal virtues. However, it was knowledge of good and evil that was traditionally stressed and taken to be of supreme importance. Attention was quite often paid to knowledge of truth and falsehood, it is certain. But, when we inquire further why knowledge of truth and falsehood was sought, we find that at the bottom it was because of the desire to possess thereby more knowledge of good and evil, and not for the sake of knowledge of truth and falsehood as such. In a word, knowledge of truth and falsehood became, so to speak, a satellite of knowledge of good and evil.

Judging by the theory of identity, knowledge of truth and falsehood is also knowledge of good and evil. The two sorts of knowledge cannot be distinguished. Judging by the theory of differentiation, they are not all the same. While knowledge of good and evil constitutes the foundation of sciences of values, that of truth and falsehood, the foundation of sciences of facts. Only when equal importance is attached to both of these two fields of knowledge may sciences of facts, in their forward march, keep pace with sciences of values. Too much discrimination in favor of knowledge of good and evil, though it promotes the growth of sciences of values, can in no way stimulate the progress of sciences of facts. That natural sciences were not developed in China may be attributed, among other things, to the fact that traditional philosophic contemplation overemphasized knowledge of good and evil and slighted knowledge of truth and falsehood.

Kaotze did not explicitly say that what is true is different from what is good and that the true and the good are of equal importance. But it may be

safely assumed that he held such views if we make right deduction from his belief that benevolence is internal and righteousness external. Kaotze differentiated between benevolence and righteousness, each possessing its special characteristic. The special characteristic of benevolence is that it is "internal and not external", and that of righteousness, "external and not internal". On the point and to the extent that one is internal and the other external, benevolence and righteousness are opposites.

As has been explained above, the statement "righteousness is external and not internal" implies that whether or no there is righteousness is something to be determined by the object matter being recognized, and not by the subject person doing the recognizing; hence righteousness serves to attain truth. In a corresponding fashion, the statement "benevolence is internal and not external" signifies that whether or no there is benevolence is something to be determined not by the object matter being recognized, but by the subject person doing the recognizing; hence benevolence serves to attain goodness. "The feeling is determined by myself." This indicates clearly that the presence or absence of benevolence is something to be determined by the subject person. "There is my younger brother;—I love him." Here, brotherly love is taken to illustrate benevolence, and it also indicates clearly that benevolence belongs to the domain of good and evil. To sum up: By distinguishing benevolence and righteousness as two different matters, did it not amount to admitting, on the part of Kaotze, that what is good may be differentiated from what is true? As to whether, as between benevolence and righteousness, there is any preference for, or priority in, one or the other, Kaotze did not express himself. Since he paralleled benevolence and righteousness, assigned to each its special characteristic, and recognized their respective individuality, conceivably he did not mean to espouse one at the expense of the other. Put positively, Kaotze must have considered truth and goodness as of equal importance.

It may now be seen that Kaotze's theory that benevolence is internal and righteousness external could, by its logic and spirit, have furnished a basis for the parallel and equal development of both sets of sciences—sciences of values and sciences of facts. Kaotze's view that benevolence is internal was shared by other contemporary thinkers. His view that righteousness is external was altogether a distinctive contribution of his own. Verily it constituted the unique feature of his system of thought. As regards natural sciences, it may be observed that, to develop natural sciences, the spirit of natural sciences must first be cultivated, and that, to cultivate the spirit of natural sciences, Kaotze's theory of righteousness being external is worth remembering because it retains

some value that ought not to be overlooked.

Kaotze's another well-known view that human nature is neither good nor evil seems to go hand in hand with his idea that righteousness is external. Human nature may be studied from varied angles. One may inquire whether human nature is, in the realm of value, good or evil, or what constitutes, in the realm of fact, the innate character of human nature. Here are the passages indicating Kaotze's viewpoint:

"Kaotze said: 'Human nature is something born with.'"

"Kaotze said: 'Man's nature is like whirling water. Open a passage for it to the east, and it will flow to the east; open a passage for it to the west, and it will flow to the west. Man's nature is indifferent to good and evil, just as the water is indifferent to the east and west.'" (*Kaotze*, Part I, *The Works of Mencius*.)

"Human nature is something born with." "Something born with" is Kaotze's definition of human nature. It means that human nature is inherent in, and original with, mankind. In the light of such a definition, Kaotze took human nature as no other than a natural phenomenon. Since human nature was taken to be a natural phenomenon it was only logical to observe human nature with the totally objective attitude of natural sciences. In itself and by itself, every thing in the world of nature has only factual, and not evaluable, qualities. Only when and where something serves to be beneficial to man does he confer thereon a positive value and call it good. Contrariwise, man confers on something a negative value and call it evil only when and where it serves to be harmful to him. Good and evil,—they are names given and qualities conferred by man; they are subjective and not objective; they are not inherent in things themselves. Human nature, when taken as a natural phenomenon, is certainly similar in character to any thing else in the world of nature. This is to say that, in itself and by itself, human nature constitutes a mere fact and possesses no inherent value of any kind: as such, there is no good or evil to be spoken of.

In his theory of righteousness being external, Kaotze maintained that whether or no there is righteousness is something to be determined solely by the object matter being recognized and that no subject element should enter into consideration. Since human nature is neither good nor evil and since righteousness is external and not internal, we may say of human nature that it can neither do good nor do evil. The only conclusion left is: "Man's nature is indifferent to good and evil." If we consider Kaotze's view of righteousness being external as the first fundamental principle in his epistemology or in his methodology we may assert that his doctrine of the indifference of man's

nature to good and evil is a foregone conclusion. Logically he could not have held a different doctrine.

There is another aspect of human nature which Kaotze touched upon. He remarked: "To desire for food and sex is human nature." Kaotze listed only food and sex and nothing else. From this we may well imagine how much Kaotze regarded the desire for food and sex as most basic in human nature. And modern biologists do tell us that the one universal characteristic of all living organisms is survival and reproduction. It is perhaps sufficient to conclude from all the foregoing that Kaotze's view of righteousness being external could, if adequately emphasized and fully developed, have been very helpful in promoting the progress of natural sciences.