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    National Tsing Hua University Institutional Repository > 科技管理學院  > 計量財務金融學系 > 期刊論文 >  An empirical analysis of the effects of increasing deductibles on moral hazard


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nthur.lib.nthu.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/62100


    Title: An empirical analysis of the effects of increasing deductibles on moral hazard
    Authors: Wang JL;Chung CF;Tzeng LY
    教師: 鐘經樊
    Date: 2008
    Publisher: American Risk and Insurance Association
    Relation: JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE ,American Risk and Insurance Association,Volume: 75,Issue: 3,551-566,SEP 2008
    Keywords: CONTRACTS
    EQUILIBRIUM
    DISCRIMINATION
    COST
    ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
    ADVERSE SELECTION
    INSURANCE MARKETS
    AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
    PRIVATE INFORMATION
    Abstract: Using information on timing and number of claims in a unique data set pertaining to comprehensive automobile insurance with the increasing deductible provision in Taiwan, the authors provide new evidence for moral hazard. Time-varying correlations between the choice of the insurance coverage and claim occurrence are significantly positive and exhibit a smirk pattern across policy months. This empirical finding supports the existence of asymmetric information. A subsample estimation depicts insured drivers' significant responses to increasing deductibles, which implies the existence of moral hazard. According to the probit regression results, the increasing deductible makes policyholders who have ever filed claims less likely to file additional claims later in the policy year. The empirical findings strongly support the notion that the increasing deductible provision helps control moral hazard.
    URI: www.aria.org/
    http://nthur.lib.nthu.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/62100
    Appears in Collections:[計量財務金融學系] 期刊論文

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