

南宋君主和言官

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言官力量的大小，從北宋到南宋，變化相當大。北宋初期，朝廷上並沒有多少議論。經過考試制度的發展和儒學新見解的生長，若干新興的士大夫才開始發揮他們的政治主張。一方面君主對他們相當優容，一方面其他官僚也承認他們的領導作用。言官力量最大是在北宋中期，仁宗英宗兩朝。同時，也有流弊。仁宗時“宰執與台諫，分為敵壘，以交戰於庭。台諫持宰執之短長，以驚擊為風采。…宰執亦持台諫之短長，植根於內廷。”¹英宗時，更藉口追崇生父的禮節問題，引起所謂“濮議。”主要的弱點是士大夫之間，意見和意氣的衝突；而制度上沒找到一種更好的議事程序和容納及對意見的處置。北宋晚期，神宗和王安石的銳意改革，接着舊法黨推翻新法，最後再行新法，設立“元祐黨禁”，不許舊法黨留在政府裏，只是鞏固權位，而早已失去了改革的精神。經過這幾十年的演變，言官力量大為減削。

南宋教育比北宋更發達，儒學影響也更為龐大。但言官始終沒有力量。雖然有少數士大夫反對和議，有好幾次太學生掀動政潮，發表政治主張，但這都反證旁人起來說話，而言官本身反倒是“在其位，不謀其政。”一般解釋都歸咎於權相箝制言官，甚至利用附和的言官來排除異己。最初，秦檜“力主和議…而外論羣起，計雖定而未敢舉行。[龍]如淵言於檜曰：‘相公為天下大計，而羣說橫起。何不擇人為台官，使盡擊去？則相公之事遂矣。’檜大悟，遂擢如淵中司，人皆駭愕。”²這種手段，“習以成俗。”³韓侂胄當權時，有“慶元黨禁。”史彌遠長期執政，諫官的稿本，要先經他看過。⁴賈似道也同樣：“台諫言事，悉用庸懦易制者為之。…惟取遠小州太守及州縣小官，毛舉細故，應故事而已。”⁵總之，“權臣所用台諫，必其私人。約言已堅，而後出命。其所彈擊，悉承風旨。”⁶這些都是事實，但決不是唯一的解釋。縱容權相把持是君主自己願意。至少君主可以另選旁人，不用宰相所推薦的人做台諫。南宋官私記載，往往歸罪權臣，避免批評天子。元代修宋史，也是如此。無形中留下一個印象，好像南宋皇帝都不錯。事實上，南宋雖然沒有暴

君，而從孝宗以下，多半昏庸。最大的例證是理宗。因為他表面上崇尚道學，一度任用道學派的大臣，所以得此美諡；而宋元時代的記載，總是替他隱惡揚善。其實，理宗是常常溺於酒色，並未改善當時的政局。⁷這篇短文，不能去討論南宋君主整個的問題，只是提出他們除了任用權相之外，同時自己也用各種手段來應付和控制言官。南宋言官力量之所以薄弱，君主要負絕大的責任。

第一、南宋君主對於言官，常用拖延敷衍的手段。例如徐經孫劾近習董宋臣，“一日之間，兩被聖旨。既諭之曰：‘雖未盡行，已示意向。’又諭之曰：‘儘有商量，豈待促迫？’”⁸理宗時，不但這些太監逍遙得意，宮內還常有方士、女冠、娼妓進出。外戚子弟，則任畿輔地方的監司郡守。言官論奏，就“宣諭節貼”，好像接受勸告，其實一點不改。⁹有時，僅只是當時口頭敷衍；下面一段記載，頗為生動，是理宗之前，甯宗時代的情形：¹⁰

“臣聞自古人主患不容受。陛下每於臣僚奏對，言雖訐直，必務優容。可謂有容受之量。然受言之名甚美，用言之效蔑聞。毋乃聽納雖廣，誠意不加。始悅而終違，面從而心拒。軒陛之間，應和酬酢，密若有契於淵衷。進對之臣，亦自以為得上意。退朝之暇，寂不見於施行。蓋有宣泄於小人，而遂罹中傷者矣。潛沮士氣，陰長諛習，莫甚於此。”

照常理說，君主不採納言官的主張，儘可明說。歷朝沿用的辦法是“留中”，把奏摺擺在一邊，不置可否。而南宋君主不同，要格外的一日兩諭，假裝個宣諭節貼的形式，或是當面酬酢，很客氣的樣子。這是為什麼？當然，只有一個目的，表面上崇尚儒家理論，避免拒諫的壞名聲，怕引起官僚們之間擴大的宣傳。理宗曾經很坦白的說過：“納忠不妨，但勿散副本。”¹¹換言之，言官多批評幾句，沒關係，反正聽過就算了。只要不傳到外面去，讓許多人都知道。這種用心，從高宗起，早就這樣。胡銓反對屈辱講和，是紹興八年（1138）的大事。高宗特別下詔，嚴加戒諭，指摘胡銓的態度失當，是這樣說的：“初投匭而未出，已騰稿而四傳。導倡陵犯之風，陰懷劫持之計。倘誠心於體國，但合輸忠〔即只向皇帝說，外面不講〕。惟專意于取名，故茲眩衆。”¹²從這些例證可以看出南宋君主，除非不得已，才公然責備言者。沒有必要時，總希望敷衍過去，不願意人言藉藉。

第二種手段是“調護”，就是調解一下，叫被批評的從此謹慎一點，叫言官不

必再多說，而實際上是庇護。杜範曾屢次指摘理宗不該如此：“首用洪咨夔、王遂為台諫……蒸蒸然有向治之意。然……廟堂之上，牽制尚多。言及貴近，或委曲回護……或彼此調停。”又說：“終歸於調護……又復聞上命而輒止。”¹³ 林希逸撰劉後村行狀，明說君主對於言官“雖擇其人，而不授其柄，但見調護，使之勿言。”¹⁴ 不願意聽諫，而還是要用比較有名望的人做言官，無非是借他們做幌子，欺瞞一般官僚的耳目。

第三種手段更妙，“抑言獎身”。上面提過的杜範不留餘地的指出：“抑其言而獎其身，則是陛下外有好諫之名，內有拒諫之實。”¹⁵ 抑言的方式也妙。不是完全抹殺，而是把言官原來的奏議刪改一下，再行發表，並且說已經聽了這言官的好意見。“但有報可之虛文，曾無施行之實事……每加節略，而文理不全。或至易寫，而台印無有，中書不敢執奏。”何以如此費事假裝這一套呢？只是為了“畏其去台諫之名，而曰姑留之而已。”¹⁶ 這種手段，其實也是創自高宗。紹興五年（1135），派使向金求和，胡寅反對。下詔說：“中青舍人胡寅論使事，辭旨剴切詳明，深得論思之體。令學士院賜詔獎諭。”¹⁷ 但派使求和的方針，並未絲毫改變。

除了上述三種虛偽應付的手段之外，還有控制，或是指示言官故意提出，或是命令言官不要說話。這種手段，也從高宗開始就有。“紹興末，台諫奉行天子風旨，有宣諭使言者，有宣諭不得言者。”¹⁸ 這時秦檜已死，決不能諉過於權相，明明是皇帝自己的作風。甯宗時照樣：“聞者大臣去位，一章而罷，如棄土梗。借曰台諫之言，不得不從。則前日之抗言極論，列名奏疏，何迫之以宣諭，而果於拒人也？”¹⁹ 足見南宋君主對於言官，只是利用——利用他們的名望，用得著的時候叫他們來出頭說話，此外卻不太聽從他們的主張。

不許言官說某些事情，例證很多。高宗用秦檜執行求和政策，就“詔台諫為國愛人，勿復再言，出榜朝堂。”²⁰ 又信用一個醫生，叫王繼先。此人還主編過一本醫書，有日本版。²¹ 在當時很有權勢。“台諫有論列二人者，上曰：‘檜國之司命。繼先，朕之司命。’自此言者遂沮。”²² 孝宗時比較好，禁止言官論列的事少得多。光宗時又壞起來了。彭龜年是甯宗做皇子時的老師，在光宗時，就說光宗：“雖聽用固亦不少，然或不行，或訓飭，或宣諭。”在甯宗時，又力言不該不聽言官的話，反倒相信特務的小報告。他論“遷者之弊”說：“今日言一事，實也，而明日則

虛矣。明日言一事，虛也，而後日則實矣。…千變萬化，而…權已在其股掌之中。以術御之者，又不過取其所畏惡者，隨而察之。”²³ 不許言官說話，再舉豪門史家前後兩個例證就夠了。史嵩之當權，台諫批評。“上以御劄付台諫…自今勿復羣撫，以全大體。”²⁴ 史彌遠死後，言官乘機追論他的子姪們。“御筆謂朕欲全功臣之世，而人言不已。戒飭史宅之等安分畏法。…仍令自今中外臣僚…毋得羣撫，務存大體。”²⁵

君主雙管齊下——又利用，又控制——言官的處境是相當不容易的。周必大親受孝宗賞識，而孝宗又的確是南宋君主之中最好的一個，可是周就兩次因為言事，離開中央政府。隆興元年（1163）是攻擊近習曾覿、龍大淵，無效而去。乾道八年（1172）又因為反對外戚張說，稱疾而歸。²⁶ 一般說來，凡是做過言官的人，很少被君主喜歡，陞為侍從，多半是另任閑職或外調。²⁷ 往往言官因拒諫而去，還可以受到若干其他官僚的稱譽，雖然失去地位，聲望更高。因此南宋君主有的時候既不聽言官的話，又不許辭職，弄得言官上不上，下不下。“給舍駁正，台諫論列，固其職也。而連章累疏，則沮格不行。備禮請去，則眷留甚力。”²⁸

但對於君主這種態度，這些手段，一般官僚們的反應自然是推諉責任，說是沒有辦法，錯處全在皇帝自己。徐經孫說：²⁹

“而切觀時事，深有疑焉。數月以來，惟內批之煩，僥倖得志。而名器之褻，中外隱憂。問之大臣，固常執奏矣，或謂上意之難回，是陛下為大臣分過也。問之給事，固常繳駁矣，或謂宣諭之狎至，是陛下為給事分過也。問之侍從，非不論奏也，或謂不見於施行，是陛下為侍從分過也。問之台諫，非不抨彈也，或謂尚聞於節貼，是陛下為台諫分過也。夫上而輔弼，下而有司，本為救過之地，而今也下有所議，上未必從，反未免有分過之疑。”

南宋君主，自以為善用手段，使言官以及百官，都在掌握之中，“跳不出如來佛掌心。”結果，官僚也是一片虛偽，上下相矇，人心早已渙散。所以等到蒙古兵攻破襄陽，從長江上游往東進攻，官吏紛紛投降或逃走。像文天祥、陸秀夫，以及其他數百人，見於昭忠錄一類書的，只不過百分之一二。南宋亡國時的節義，雖然勝於北宋之末，也並不像史冊給人印象那樣高，實際上也許不如明末。

這篇短文，就此打住。可是想借這機會，提出四點推論來請教各方面的學人。

第一是思想史上的問題。南宋道學興起，特重“正心誠意。”在當時，在後世，常常覺得這不免迂濶。果真如此嗎？當時儒者看透皇帝和官僚的虛偽，深深覺悟不從道德風氣上來倡導精神改革，還有什麼出路？至於這種倡導，是否收效，是另一個問題，也是儒教史上一個最基本的問題。是不是在許多限制之下，它還是有相當影響的？政治上的功效也許少些，對社會道德是不是頗有貢獻？第二是制度史上的問題。政治制度或制度的規定是一回事，例如北宋南宋改變不大。政治作風或制度的運用，又是一回事，南宋風氣，大不相同。是不是研究制度史必須兼顧這兩方面？第三，想應用這看法，提出一個假設，供大家討論。從北宋起到近代，都是君主專制或君主極權。可是任用大批受高等教育的職業官僚，是一個特色，與世界史上其他的君主極權不同。因為用了許多官僚，君主也就慢慢學會——像這篇短文所描述的——用些老奸巨滑的官僚手段，來應付和控制官僚。假定如此，我們是不是可以說中國近千年來是一種特殊的，“官僚化的君主極權”？而這也就是儒家最大的矛盾？第四，是中國史分期的問題。分期該從各種角度來看。從經濟，從君主極權，從科舉官僚來看，唐末五代到宋初，是一個大變化。假定再從次要一方面來看，看官僚的政治作風，南宋也許是定型的關鍵期。以後各朝，始終沒改變這形態。這裏面也許還有地理區域的關係。

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註

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- 2 畢沅續資治通鑑（1957校印本），卷121，頁3193。
- 3 袁燾絜齋集（武英殿聚珍版），卷2，頁16。
- 4 丁傳靖（輯），宋人軼事彙編（1935），卷18，頁902。
- 5 劉一清錢塘遺事（武林掌故叢編），卷5，頁9。
- 6 黃震戊辰修史傳（四明叢書），頁2。
- 7 宋人軼事彙編，卷3，頁91—93；又，卷18，頁907。戊辰修史傳，頁11。
- 8 徐經孫徐文惠公存稿（宋人集），卷1，頁24。

- 9 錢塘遺事，卷5，頁6。
- 10 衛涇後樂集（四庫珍本），卷10，頁16。
- 11 宋人軼事彙編，卷3，頁91。
- 12 續資治通鑑，卷121，頁3198。
- 13 杜範杜清獻公集（靜嘉堂文庫藏明刊本）卷5，頁11；又卷6，頁14。
- 14 林希逸竹溪鬳齋十一稿續集（靜嘉堂文庫藏鈔本），卷23，頁8。
- 15 戊辰修史傳，頁6。
- 16 杜清獻公集，卷8，頁2；又卷7，頁5。
- 17 續資治通鑑，卷115，頁3065。
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- 23 彭龜年止堂集（武英殿聚珍版書），卷1，頁10；又卷11，頁4。
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- 25 袁甫蒙齋集（武英殿聚珍版書），卷5，頁10。
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- 28 後樂集，卷10，頁18。
- 29 徐文惠公存稿，卷1，頁10。

THE SOUTHERN SUNG EMPERORS AND THE OPINION OFFICIALS

JAMES T. C. LIU

The term "opinion officials," a literal translation of *yen-kuan*, refers collectively to all policy-critic advisers and censors. Their power at court, a modest one at the beginning, rose to great height by the middle of the Northern Sung, along

with the rise of neo-Confucianism. Thereafter, it was unfortunately undermined by factional strifes that occurred successively during the reform led by Wang An-shih, the anti-reform phase, and especially the restored-reform phase with its notorious persecution of political opponents.

In the Southern Sung, the opinion officials never regained sufficient importance; the further spread of education and the gathering strength of neo-Confucian thought notwithstanding. A few opposition movements were mounted by the student leaders at the National University, while the opinion officials, those who had the duty to speak up, did not. The usual interpretation blames the prime ministers or chief councillors who dominated the bureaucracy and packed these particular posts with their own friends. No doubt true to a large extent, it leaves out an essential element. After all, it was the emperors who kept the chief councillors in power. More than that, Kao-tsung, the founder of the Southern Sung, and the succeeding emperors dealt with the opinion officials with sophisticated skill. On the one hand, they manipulated and controlled these officials; on the other hand, they managed to protect a good Confucian image for themselves. When blame became unavoidable, it would fall upon the dismissed chief councillors and hardly upon the emperors themselves.

A usual way of dealing with criticism was delaying tactics. Not necessarily pigeonholed it as in former times, the Southern Sung emperor might listen to it with ostensible grace, a word of appreciation, a brief announcement that such an advice was received, but no further action. By going through these motions, it seemed that the sovereign did pay some attention to the criticism as well as the Confucian principles behind it. Yet the seeming technicality as if the matter was still pending consideration would preclude the complaining official from making an issue out of it. In some cases, he was explicitly told not to circulate unofficial copies of his critical memorial among the scholar-officials so that they would know little beside the court version.

Reconciliation was another technique. In response to a criticism, the emperor would offer some explanation or excuse, suggest that the criticism might not have been well founded, and ask the opinion official to be more considerate. He would then turn around to caution the bureaucrat under attack to mend his ways and to avoid further criticism. Sometimes, the emperor would call both sides together and tell them to compose their differences. The alleged misunderstanding between them, once so cleared, should be forgotten. In effect, the emperor was shielding his minister from unwelcomed criticism.

A third way was a paradoxical one: to praise the opinion official in person for making an criticism and yet to have it suppressed. The emperor would express his approval of and respect for this critic in doing his duty and taking a bold stand. However, in a carefully edited report of his criticism, its most dama-

ging part would be tuned down or even left out. Such a report carried the impression as if the criticism had already been approved by the emperor, though in reality no step was undertaken to have it implemented. The gesture was by no means an empty one; it was meant to give the opinion official some nominal or psychological satisfaction as well as to keep up the appearance that the censorial system was functioning well.

Accommodating without really adhering to the critical opinion was only part of the story. On various occasions, the Southern Sung emperors would take the initiative in telling some opinion officials either what they should bring up or what they should not. A few outstanding examples, among numerous cases, would suffice here. When the sovereign was no longer pleased with a certain minister, he would cause censuring memorials to be presented and use them as the justification to have the minister dismissed. It was one stone that killed two birds: the monarch not only had his way but also enhanced his Confucian image for honoring criticism. At times, absolutism did not care enough about its image. Ch'in Kuei, responsible for the humiliating peace with the Chin, suffered from heated condemnation. At the same time, so it happened, there were also attacks upon Wang Chi-hsien, a palace doctor who made use of his position to gain many excessive favors. And this was what Emperor Kao-tsung said: "Ch'in Kuei is taking care of the fate of the state, while Wang Chi-hsien is taking care of our personal fate." Thus they were both made immune from criticism. Against the explicit wish of the absolutist, the opinion officials were simply powerless. A similar case concerns the Shih family. Shih Mi-yüan had been for many years the chief councillor. After his death, several critics began to speak up, exposed his faults retroactively, and demanded that his sons and nephews should be dismissed from their positions and deprived of their privileges. But the emperor declared that he did not wish to hear such criticism any more, as it was his wish to honor a deceased high official who had served the court so long by letting his descendants keep their due rewards.

What made the matter worse was the fact that the emperors instead of listening to the opinion officials lent their ears to intelligence agents. P'eng Kuei-nien, who had been a tutor of Ning-tsung before he became the emperor, felt close enough to him to offer a sincere and vivid advice: "Today these intelligence agents would make a true report, tomorrow they would report something false, and on the third day it would be something true again.... Through infinite variations [of mixed truth and falsehood].... power has already fallen into their hands. The superior may think he has ways of controlling them, but it is no more than checking upon those reports on whom he himself suspects and dislikes." Needless to say, this opinion had no effect either.

It was hard for conscientious opinion officials to put up with the situation.

Chou Pi-ta, a leading statesman for whom Hsiao-tsung, the best emperor of the Southern Sung, had considerable respect, found it so frustrating that he insisted on resignation and left the court. The first time was when he pointed out the faults of two palace officials and the second occasion, about a decade later, resulted from his complaint of the influence exercised by a member of the consort family. Many other opinion officials with lesser prestige as well as determination could not even get out of the dilemma they found themselves in: the emperor would neither honor their views nor permit them to resign for such a resignation tended to hurt the Confucian image of the ruler and publicize the reputation of this official as a courageous one in opposition. Generally speaking, the career of the opinion officials would not go up further; they were either transferred to local government posts or given some honorary court positions without power.

By resorting to containing and manipulating techniques, the monarchs thought they had the opinion officials—and by the same token, all the other bureaucrats—well under control. What they failed to realize was a simple truth: hypocrisy produced only the same response in kind. Hsü Ching-sun in late Southern Sung had a penetrating analysis in his memorial:

Looking at the current events, your servant has grave doubts. In the last few months, there have been a large number of direct orders from the palace [bypassing regular governmental procedures]....The leading councillors, when asked, explain that in spite of their making objections they could not dissuade Your Majesty. This means that Your Majesty partakes some blame for their default. The reviewing officials, upon being questioned, claim that they have held up such orders for your re-consideration but Your Majesty has given repeated orders to confirm them. This means that Your Majesty partakes some blame for their default. The attending officials, when asked, also maintain that they have presented contrary views, but to no avail. This means that Your Majesty partakes some blame for their default. Likewise, the opinion officials deny that they have failed to criticize such orders; but only some of their criticism have been noted and even these criticism have had no effect. This means that Your Majesty also partakes some blame for the default of the opinion officials.

The net result was a demoralized bureaucracy, the Confucian image notwithstanding. When the Mongols captured Hsiang-yang, swept down to the Yangtze, and turned eastward along the river, the majority of both military officers and civilian officials either surrendered or fled. Probably no more than one per cent of them defended the realm with their lives. Great examples of loyalty like Lu Hsiu-fu and Wen T'ien-hsiang were indeed rare exceptions. To be fair, the level of loyalty among the official class upon the fall of the Southern Sung did surpass the case of the Northern Sung. However, contrary to the impression one may

gather from the standard histories, it can hardly be compared favorably to what later happened at the end of the Ming dynasty.

This article, rather confined in scope and brief in analysis, may nevertheless permit us to pose four broad problems that are admittedly exploratory but might deserve some future investigations. First, a problem in intellectual history. The School of the True Way (*Tao-hsüeh*) was both at the time and in later generations often thought to be impracticable because of its predominant emphasis upon self-cultivation: rectification of heart and sincerity of mind. However, it is necessary to understand the circumstances that gave birth to it. Given the pervasive hypocrisy throughout the court and the bureaucracy, with everyone nominally a Confucianist, what alternatives were there other than a movement for spiritual rededication and moral renovation? Even though the teachings of this school brought little noticeable political improvement at the time, can it be said that it did not in the long run make a fundamental contribution to the moral standard of the society, of which politics was but a part? Second, a problem in institutional history. The formal political institutions may undergo little change, but a different mode of operating them may spell enormous dissimilarities. A comparison between the Northern and the Southern Sung, as has been shown, offers an instructive case. Third, on the nature of absolutism in the last thousand years of Chinese history. The Northern Sung emperors relied a great deal upon the bureaucrats who came up through the civil service examination. During the Southern Sung, the emperors quite familiar with the ways of the bureaucrats adopted many of their techniques to deal with them. By virtue of this mode of operation, may we not describe this polity as "bureaucratic absolutism"? If so, this may well be a fatal self-negation of the Confucian state. Lastly, with regard to the problem of periodization in Chinese history. In the broadest terms, from the standpoint of crucial changes in political, economic, and social structure, the time between the late T'ang and the early Sung was the great divide. However, at a secondary level, from the standpoint of bureaucratic politics, is it not reasonable to regard the Northern Sung as the pioneering stage and the Southern Sung as the pattern-setting stage? It seems that this pattern once set went on for many centuries without much fundamental change. Perhaps the moving of the capital to the south and the shift of the key political area to the lower Yangtze valley also had something to do with it.