

FIFTY YEARS OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY ABROAD

WING-TSIT CHAN (陳榮捷)

This is a presentation of personal reflections which, I hope, will reflect on Chinese philosophy in the last fifty years in the United States. My involvement has four phases, namely, explanation, translation, elaboration on Chinese philosophical categories, and research on Chu Hsi 朱熹 (1130-1200). This is an oversimplification, of course, and the four phases overlap one another.

When I went to Honolulu to teach Chinese philosophy in 1936, I found Chinese philosophy characterized as negative, as a religion, and as no philosophy at all. Those few interested in Chinese philosophy were mostly missionaries or former missionaries who honestly believed that Christianity was superior to Confucianism. They concentrated on the Confucian saying, "Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you."⁽¹⁾ They understood the Confucian doctrine of "love with distinction" (*ai yu ch'a-teng* 愛有差等⁽²⁾) as love with degrees as if one should love one's parents 100% but one's uncle only 90%. They never realized that no Chinese had ever interpreted that Confucian saying in the negative sense, that words with a negative prefix such as *unlimited* can be very positive, and that *ch'a-teng* never meant degrees in love but simply differences in application in accordance with different human relations. They never heard of Chang Tsai's 張載 (1020-1077) *Western Inscription*,⁽³⁾ which regards Heaven and Earth as one's parents and all people as brethren, and each one's work as one's social and moral duty. As Ch'eng I 程頤 (1033-1107) explained it, the *Inscription* demonstrates the doctrine of "principle being one but its manifestations being many" (*li-i fen-shu* 理一分殊), that is, love is one and universal but its application differs according to one's lot or position.⁽⁴⁾ Fortunately, as American scholars have become more acquainted with Neo-Confucian works since World War II, the negative interpretation of the so-called "Silver Rule," in contrast to the Christian Golden Rule, has declined.

At the same time, there is still the lingering attitude to look upon Confucianism as a religion. In many libraries the Confucian Classics are still classified among religious scriptures and courses on Confucianism are still offered in the religions department in many universities. As a religion, Confucianism is regarded as underdeveloped because it lacks a church and the belief in a personal God.

(1) *Analects*, 12:2, 15:23.

(2) *Book of Mencius*, 3B:5.

(3) *Chang Tzu ch'üan-shu* 張子全書 (Complete works of Master Chang), ch. 1.

(4) *I-ch'uan wen-chi* 伊川文集 (Collection of literary works Ch'eng I), 5:12a-b in the *Erh-Ch'eng ch'üan-shu* 二程全書 (Complete works of the two Ch'engs) (*Ssu-pu pei-yao* 四部備要 [Essentials of the Four Libraries] ed.).

However, with a greater understanding of Chinese thought, it is increasingly realized that with a strong commitment to the Mandate of Heaven, the conception of Heaven (*T'ien* 天) on the part of Confucianists, especially Chu Hsi, is extremely personal. Thus Confucianism is a religion in the true sense of the word, though it does not conform to the structure of traditional Western religions. This fact is generally recognized in the last several decades. The trouble is that while Confucianism is accepted as a religion, it is not accepted as a philosophy.

There are only a handful of institutions where Chinese thought is studied in the philosophy department. Many Western scholars still grant that there is Chinese thought but not philosophy. They consider Chinese thought to grow out of intuition or experience and not postulation or logical analysis. They also point to the fact that there is hardly any work of sustained deliberation and argument as Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is true that even Tung Chung-shu's 董仲舒 (176-104 B.C.) *Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu* 春秋繁露 (Luxuriant gems of the *Spring and Autumn Annals*), Chang Tsai's *Cheng-meng* 正蒙 (Correting youthful ignorance), or Tai Chen's 戴震 (1723-1777) *Meng Tzu tzu-i shu-cheng* 孟子字義疏證 (Commentary on the meaning of terms in the *Book of Mencius*) are not systematic, continuous, and logical philosophical discussions. Ancient Chinese and Buddhist logical systems never developed; Hsün Tzu's 荀子 (c. 313-c. 238 B.C.) chapter on "The Rectification of Names"⁽⁵⁾ is at best preliminary. However, China's failure to develop a logical system or to produce books on philosophy is not the same thing as China having no philosophy or Chinese philosophers not thinking rationally. I was amazed to see how consistent Chu Hsi's thoughts were over the decades. His thinking was quite clear and distinct.

In the face of all these misunderstandings, I decided from the very start that it is better simply to explain than to argue, and the best way to explain is to lead the reader to original sources so he can find out for himself. This led me to translation.

I worked on my *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* off and on for over ten years. It was a difficult task because it involves ancient and modern thought, Buddhist and Communist philosophy, and literary styles of various periods. I set a seven-fold standard for myself. First, I consulted as many commentaries as possible. Take the opening sentence of the *Analects*, "Is it not a pleasure to learn and to *hsi* from time to time what has been learned?" James Legge, following Chu Hsi, translated *hsi* as "practice."⁽⁶⁾ In revolt against Legge, Arthur Waley chose to rely on Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) commentators and rendered the term "to repeat," that is, to recite.⁽⁷⁾ They probably did not realize that in the nineteenth

(5) *Hsün Tzu*, ch. 16, section no. 22. For an English translation, see *Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings*, tr. by Burton Watson, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 139-156, "Rectifying Names".

(6) James Legge, trans., *Confucian Analects*.

(7) Arthur Waley, trans. *The Analects of Confucius* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1938)

century both extremes were rejected. Liu Pao-nan 劉寶楠 (1791-1855), for example, understood *hsi* as both to practice and to recite, taking recitation as but one item in the practice.⁽⁸⁾ Secondly, all terms must be explained. Thirdly, all sets like the Five Constant Virtues of Humanity, Righteousness, Propriety, Wisdom, and Faithfulness must be itemized. Fourthly, all titles of books and articles must be translated. This is not an easy thing to do. Often one has to read the preface of the book or go to other sources to find out the true meaning of the title. If one merely translates the title literally, one may end up in error, as in the case of J.P. Bruce, who translated *chin-ssu* 近思 as "modern thought,"⁽⁹⁾ without realizing the term comes from the *Analects*, 19:6 where it means reflections on things at hand. Even today only a few translators have translated all titles, but the practice should be encouraged because a translation will give the reader some insight into what the work is all about. My fifth standard was to identify or account for all places and persons. Sixthly, I attempted to trace all quotations. For the ancient Confucian Classics, one can readily get help from an index if one knows the key word or remembers the first word of the quotation. For Buddhist and Neo-Confucian quotations, Japanese annotations may give some lead to half of them, but the translator still has to trace the rest. Finally, I made brief comments on certain significant passages to alert the reader of the significant role the passage has played in the history of Chinese philosophy. Take for example in the *Lao Tzu* 老子, ch. 42, where it is said that "Tao 道 produced the One, the One produced the two, and the two produced the three," I pointed out that instead of childish arithmetic, as it is sometimes thought of, it forms the pattern of cosmological evolution common in all Chinese philosophical schools.⁽¹⁰⁾ There have been comments on translations before, but they were personal reflections or elaborations rather than indications of the relevance of the passage to the development of Chinese thought.

While I am on the subject of translation, let me make a few further comments. I would translate and not transliterate except in a few cases, for too many would make it difficult for the reader to remember. I realize that no English word can coincide with the Chinese original exactly, so that in any translation some foreign element creeps in and some original element is lost. One simply has to bring out the essential element in the original term. Take *wu-shing* 五行, for instance. According to Cheng Hsüan's 鄭玄 (127-200) commentary on the "Hung-fan 洪範" (Grand plan) chapter of the *Book of History* where the phrase originated, *hsing* is

(8) Liu Pao-nan, *Lun-yü cheng-i* 論語正義 (Correct meanings of the *Analects*).

(9) J.P. Bruce, *Chu Hsi and His Masters* (London: Probsthain & Co., 1923), p. xiii, Bibliography.

(10) *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 161.

"material force operating according to nature."⁽¹¹⁾ The term has been variously rendered as "Five Elements," "Five Aspects," "Five Powers," etc. It can readily be seen that "Five Elements" and "Five Aspects" are too static for this dynamic concept. "Five Powers" is misleading because it is too easily associated with the Three Powers (*san-ts'ai* 三才), that is, heaven, earth, and man. "Five Phases" is now popular among many scholars. So long as the term denotes five stages of the succession of five dynasties, it is appropriate. But *wu-hsing* is not merely a theory of history. Each of the five represents a quality, like liquidity and hotness for fire and liquidity and coolness for water. As it is said in the "Hung-fan," "Water means whatever is moist and descending and fire means whatever is heated and ascending."⁽¹²⁾ This being the case, the character of each of the five has an influence on other things. It is for this reason that Water is equated with Wisdom, for example, because a wise person benefits everything, adjusts to varying conditions, and is humble. Thus the five correspond to the Five Constant Virtues in the order of Rigueousness, Humanity, Wisdom, Propriety, and Faithfulness.⁽¹³⁾ Basically, *hsing* means to act. Metal, for example, acts on something and causes it to acquire a certain quality, very much like a chemical agent causing a substance to change. For this reason I have translated the term as "Five Agents." It is admittedly unsatisfactory but none of the alternatives is really better.

In many cases, various translations are equally good. *Li* 理, for instance, may be rendered as principle, order, pattern, reason, or law, although it is important to remember that principle and pattern are not mutually exclusive, as some scholars have maintained, for pattern or order is merely one of the principles. Sometimes a term cannot be translated literally but must be interpreted, but I would reduce interpretation to the minimum. I would avoid confusion in translations. "Love" should not be used to translate *jen* 仁 (humanity), for example, for "love" should be reserved for *ai* 愛. I would avoid hyphenated translations like "heart-mind" for *hsin* 心, "Non-ultimate-ultimate of nonbeing" for *wu-chi* 無極, "reverence-seriousness" for *ching* 敬, "Cosmic active and passive forces-spiritual beings" for *kuei-shen* 鬼神, etc., partly because it is awkward to read and partly because it does not remove the ambiguity the hyphenated translation is intended to remove, for the reader does not know which of the two possibilities applies in the case. In such cases, I much prefer to translate differently according to the context. One point to be emphasized is that any translation should be good not only for the case at hand but as far as possible for the entire history of Chinese philosophy. A translator should not alter the text, much less change an honorific name to a private name. The present practice, widely followed by many scholars, of using

(11) Cheng Hsüan's commentary is found in the *Shih-san ching chu-shu* 十三經註疏 (Commentaries and subcommentaries of the Thirteen Classics).

(12) *Book of History*, "Hung-fan," sec. 5.

(13) Cheng Hsüan's commentary on the first sentence of the *Doctrine of the Mean*.

only private names should be discouraged, for the translator is not engaged in compiling a dictionary. Besides, when a correspondent addressed Chu Hsi as Yüan-hui 元晦, he showed Chu Hsi respect and there is a certain flavor in the term. Turning "Yüan-hui" into "Chu Hsi" will lose both. The thing to do is to translate the text as it is and add the private name in parenthesis or in a footnote.

In my work of translation, I have had to grab with the problem of Chinese philosophical categories. It has been a long endeavor. As early as 1942, I explained more than sixty Chinese philosophical terms in *The Dictionary of Philosophy*.⁽¹⁴⁾ In 1945, I contributed "Buddhist Religious Terminology" and "Chinese Religious Terminology" to the *Encyclopedia of Religion*.⁽¹⁵⁾ In both my *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* and my translation of the *Chin-ssu-lu* 近思錄 as *Reflections on Things at Hand*, I explained certain philosophical terms.⁽¹⁶⁾ In addition, I published two articles discussing basic Chinese philosophical concepts and Neo-Confucian ideas.⁽¹⁷⁾ I have always had the ambition to write a book on Chinese philosophical categories. Toward this end, I published a long article on "The Evolution of the Confucian Concept *Jen*" in 1955 in *Philosophy East and West*⁽¹⁸⁾ and an even longer one on "The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept of *Li* as Principle" in the *Tsing Hua* 清華 *Journal of Chinese Studies* in 1964.⁽¹⁹⁾ The hope was to write on about twenty-five categories to constitute a book. But other writings intervened. The upshot was a brief decription of some eighty-seven categories, philosophers, and schools in the *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh tz'u-tien ta-ch'üan* 中華哲學辭典大全 (Complete dictionary of Chinese philosophy), amounting to one-third of the book.⁽²⁰⁾ The evolutionary approach has been maintained, but the entries are too brief to permit detailed analysis.

(14) Dagobert D. Runes, ed., *The Dictionary of Philosophy* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1942), *passim*.

(15) Vergilius Ferm, ed., *Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945), pp. 91-110, 143-158.

(16) *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, pp. 783-791; *Reflections on Things at Hand* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 359-370.

(17) "Basic Chinese Philosophical Concepts," *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 2, no. (July, 1952), pp. 166-170; "Neo-Confucianism: New Ideas in Old Terminology", *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 17, no. 1-4 (1967), pp. 15-35.

(18) "The Evolution of the Confucian Concept *Jen*," *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 4, no. 4 (Jan. 1955), pp. 295-319. Reprinted in Wing-tsit Chan, *Neo-Confucianism, Etc.*, (Hanover, N.H.: Oriental Society, 1969), pp. 1-4, and James T. C. Liu 劉子健 and Wei-ming Tu 杜維明, ed., *Traditional China* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 123-136.

(19) "The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept of *Li* as Principle," *Tsing Hua* 清華 *Journal of Chinese Studies*, N.S. vol. 4, no. 2, (Feb. 1964), pp. 123-149. Reprinted in *Neo-Confucianism, Etc.*, pp. 45-87. Chinese translation in the *Young Sun* 人生, vol. 31, no. 6 (Oct. 1966), pp. 18-25; vol. 31, no. 7 (Nov. 1966), pp. 11-20; reprinted in *Essays on Chinese Philosophy and Thought: Sung and Ming Dynasties* (in Chinese) (Taipei: Cowboy Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 57-91.

(20) Wei Cheng-t'ung 韋政通, ed., *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh tz'u-tien ta-ch'üan* (Taipei: Cowboy Publishing Co., 1983), *passim*.

In the process of working on categories, I have come to make several observations. One is that the *Great Learning* may well be considered the first Chinese book on categories. Its beginning three principles and eight items are categories in every sense of the word, and the following chapters are explanations. The chapter titles of certain later works like Liu An's 劉安 (179-122 B.C.) *Huai-nan Tzu* 淮南子, Liu Hsiang's 劉向 (77-6 B.C.) *Shuo-yüan* 說苑 (Collection of discourses), Wang Ch'ung's 王充 (27-100) *Lun-heng* 論衡 (Balanced inquiries), and Chou Tun-i's 周敦頤 (1017-1073) *T'ung-shu* 通書 (Penetrating the *Book of Changes*) may be considered philosophical categories, though we may be stretching the definition.

Another observation is that the *T'ung-shu* begins with the category of *ch'eng* 誠 (sincerity, realness), Chu Hsi's *Chin-ssu-lu* begins with the category of *tao-t'i* 道體 (The substance of Tao), his pupil Ch'en Ch'un's 陳淳 (1159-1223) *Pei-hsi tzu-i* 北溪字義 (Ch'en Ch'un's explanation of Neo-Confucian terms) begins with *ming* 命 (The mandate of Heaven), and Tai Chen's 戴震 (1723-1777) *Meng Tzu tzu-i shu-cheng* begins with category of *li* (principle). The variation may not be meaningful except to show the purpose of the work: sincerity as the way to learn to become a sage, the substance of Tao as the foundation of self-cultivation and social development, the Mandate of Heaven to emphasize self-commitment, and *li* to underscore Tai Chen's bitter attack on the Neo-Confucian concept of principle. And yet the variation does raise the question whether *T'ai-chi* 太極 (The Great Ultimate) should remain the fundamental category in the discussion of Neo-Confucian thought as it is done in practically all the works on the subject.

My final observation is that the most influential Chinese thinker in the last 800 years, Chu Hsi, did not introduce a single philosophical category. All the concepts he discussed go back to the ancient Classics or an earlier Northern Sung (960-1126) philosopher. But in almost all cases, he expanded the meanings of the categories or gave them new interpretations. The best illustration is his treatment of the category of *jen*, on which he debated with a number of scholars for over ten years and for which he wrote a special treatise.⁽²¹⁾ In the treatise he defined *jen* as "the character of the mind" and "the principle of love."⁽²²⁾ He also traced Ch'eng I's new definition of *jen* as seed⁽²³⁾ to the mind of Heaven and Earth to produce things which man and things receive from Heaven as their mind. Thus not only substance (humanity) and function (love) are made clear but ethics and religion are rolled into one. The *Chin-ssu-lu*, which he compiled with the collaboration of Lü Tsu-ch'ien 呂祖謙 (1137-1181) in 1175, has fourteen chapters,

(21) "Jen-shuo 仁說" (A treatise on *jen*), in the *Chu Tzu wen chi* 朱子文集 (Collection of literary works of Master Chu) (*Ssu-pu pei-yao* ed. entitled *Chu Tzu ta-ch'üan* 朱子大全 (Complete literary works of Master Chu), 67:20a-21ba

(22) This definition is also found in his commentary on the *Analecets*, 1:2 in his *Lun-yü chi-chu* 論語集註 (Collected commentaries on the *Analecets*).

(23) Ch'eng I, *I-shu* 遺書 (Surviving works) (*Ssu-pu pei-yao* ed.), 18:2a, in the *Erh-Ch'eng ch'üanshu*.

each dealing with one category in the broad sense of the term. This arrangement became the pattern of almost all the Neo-Confucian anthologies in the following several hundred years in China, Korea, and Japan, notably the *Chu Tzu yü-lei* 朱子語類 (Classified converations of Master Chu) which is an indispensable source book in the study of Chu Hsi, the *Hsing-li ta-ch'üan* 性理大全 (Philosophy of nature and principle in its completeness) which was compiled by imperial order in 1415 and which dominated Chinese thought ever since, the *Chu Tzu ch'üan-shu* 朱子全書 (Complete works of Master Chu) compiled by Li Kuang-ti 李光地 (1642-1718) by imperial command, the *Hsing-li ching-i* 性理精義 (Essential ideas of nature and principle) which was also compiled by imperial command by Li Kuang-ti in 1715 and which is an abridgement of the *Hsing-li ta-ch'üan*, and many others. Thus although Chu Hsi offered no new category, his impact on the Chinese philosophical categories was tremendous.

Chu Hsi's thoughts and achievements fascinated me. As a child I recited the Four Books⁽²⁴⁾ which he grouped together and published in 1190 as the Four Masters and which had become the standard texts for school education and for civil service examinations until recent times. When I wrote "Neo-Confucianism" for the United Nations Books in 1946,⁽²⁵⁾ perhaps the first comprehensive study of Neo-Confucianism in English, I was convinced that to understand Chinese philosophy, it is absolutely necessary to understand Chu Hsi. But as late 1960, virtually no attention was paid to him in the United States. When the editor of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* asked me to write an article on Wang Yang-ming (Wang Shou- jen 王陽明, 守仁, 1472-1529), he was surprised when I suggested an article on Chu Hsi. When I spelled the name *Hsi*, he was skeptical because in English the usual order is *sh* rather than *hs*. At the time the popular Chinese thinker was Wang Yang-ming. Thanks to Dr. Suzuki Daisetz's 鈴木大拙 (1870-1966) promotion of Zen 禪 Buddhism in the West for decades and because of Wang's alleged affinity with Zen, he was popular among intellectuals. Hence the conference on him in Honolulu in 1972 in commemoration of the 500th anniversary of his birth. Ever since World War I, American scholars had been interested in China's international relations and modern reforms, and only in the 1960s attention was directed to Ming (1368-1644) thought. One scholar in a prominent university told me that Chu Hsi was too abstract. By this time I suppose he has found that the *Chin-ssu-lu* is concerned almost entirely with daily action and Chu Hsi had always considered thought and action as two wheels of a vehicle or two wings of a bird. By 1967, the eight-volume *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* project had taken Chinese philosophy seriously enough to appoint a special editor for Chinese philosophy. Without saying, Chu Hsi was the central focus.

(24) *The Great Learning*, the *Analects*, the *Book of Mencius*, and the *Doctring of the Mean*.

(25) Harley Farnsworth Macnair, ed., *China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946), pp. 254-265.

In the late 1960s, I thought the time was ripe for a thorough study of Chu Hsi. For the Sung Project in Paris, I wrote "Chu Hsi's Completion of Neo-Confucianism," in which I dealt with his determining the direction of Neo-Confucianism, his clarification of the relation between principle and material force, his development of the concept of the Great Ultimate, his bringing the concept of *jen* to culmination, his completion of the concept of *Tao-p'ung* 道統 (Tradition of the Way), and his grouping of the Four Books.⁽²⁶⁾ Whether my interpretations and conclusions are sound is not for me to say, but I dare say that there is more material on the subjects in that essay than any other before or since.

As I wrote more and more on Chu Hsi, I decided on two things. One was to publish more in Chinese. As a Chinese, I felt I should publish more in the Chinese language, and I wanted to do so in Taiwan or the Mainland rather than in Hong Kong. It began to be feasible in Taiwan in the late 1960s but it was not possible in the Mainland until 1981. It was my hope to contribute something of a permanent value. It was an extravagant hope, of course, since Chinese, Korean, and Japanese scholars have been writing on Chu Hsi for hundreds of years. However, in checking on Chu Hsi's pupils, I found many mistakes and confusion about names, places, etc., in the *Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an* 宋元學案 (Anthology and critical accounts of the Neo-Confucianists of the Sung and Yüan dynasties) and even more in the *Ju-lin tsung-p'ai* 儒林宗派 (Confucian schools and their generations) and similar works. I therefore wrote the *Chu Tzu men-jen* 朱子門人 (Chu Hsi's pupils)⁽²⁷⁾ making use of Korean and Japanese materials as well as Chinese and hope to present an accurate picture of Chu Hsi's 467 pupils and about 160 associated with him. I suspect all my works in English will be forgotten in a few decades even if they had any merit, but the *Chu Tzu men-jen* will endure with the *Ju-lin tsung-p'ai*.

The other decision I made was to study those aspects of Chu Hsi's thought and life that no Chinese, Korean, or Japanese writer had bothered to discuss. Take Chu Hsi's engagement with the book printing and book selling business. No writer has ever mentioned the subject so far as I know. None did because writers in the past had thought the subject was embarrassing to Chu Hsi or because none had noticed the scant material on the subject. But there are records of his managing the business in detail⁽²⁸⁾ and Chang Shih's (Chang Nan-hsüan

(26) In Françoise Aubin, ed., *Étude Song-Sung Studies* in memoriam Étienne Bulaz, Paris: Ser. II, #1, 1973, pp. 59-90. Chinese translation in *Chinese Cultural Renaissance Monthly* (in Chinese), no. 12 (Dec. 1974), pp. 1-4; reprinted in *Sinological Monthly* (in Chinese), no. 37 (Jan. 1975), pp. 20-43, and in my *Chu-hsüeh lun-chi* 朱學論集 (Collection of essays on Chu Hsi) (Taipei: Student Book Co., 1982), pp. 1-35.

(27) Taipei: Student Book Co., 1982, 378 pp.

(28) *Chu Tzu wen-chi*, 33:19a, 28th letter in reply to Lü Po-kung 呂伯恭 (Lü Tsu-ch'ien); *ibid.*, 27:16a-17b, 3rd letter to Commander Chan 詹; *ibid.*, 27:19a-b, 4th letter in reply to Commander Chan; *ibid.*, separate collection, 5:4a; *ibid.*, 60:1b.

張栻, 南軒, 1133-1180) objection.⁽²⁹⁾ I theorize that Chu Hsi resorted to printing business to supplement his meagre income, to prevent forgery of his works, and to spread Neo-Confucianism.⁽³⁰⁾

Another subject that writers have not talked about is Chu Hsi's religious practice. His religious ideas have been discussed for centuries in China, Korea, and Japan, but hardly a word has been said about his actual religious practice except for a few sentences in the biographical account (*hsing-chuang* 行狀) by his pupil and son-in-law, Huang Kan 黃榦 (1152-1221) about his piety in religious sacrifices.⁽³¹⁾ If a writer refers to Chu Hsi's religious life at all, he will simply repeat the sentences of the *hsing-chuang*. But the more I have gone into his daily life, the more religious I have found him to be. In fact, I am convinced he was one of the most religious men in Chinese history. Not only did he rise before dawn to perform religious sacrifice. He cared for his ancestors's graves in Anhui enough to make two long trips to visit them. When his mother died, he built a cottage by the side of her grave and stayed there for years. He reported to Confucius (551-479 B.C.) in a religious ceremony at every stage of his professional development such as building a study or a library, reconstructing an academy, or publishing a set of Classics.⁽³²⁾ As a government official, aside from practical measures to prevent draught, he prayed to deities for help.⁽³³⁾ During most of his life, he was devoted to revising social and religious ceremonies, so much so that the day before he died, he wrote his son-in-law and another pupil to carry on his compilation of books on rites.⁽³⁴⁾ He unflinchingly believed in the Mandate of Heaven.⁽³⁵⁾

Chu Hsi is now attracting many top-notch American scholars. The enthusiasm for him is fast spreading. Whereas there was no course or seminar on him ten years ago, there are now several in outstanding American universities. In this connection, the Regional Seminar on Neo-Confucianism at Columbia University is worth mentioning. Organized by Professor Wm. Theodore de Bary in the mid-1970s and initially supported by the Americal Council of Learned Societies, it

(29) *Nan-hsüan Hsien-sheng wen-chi* 南軒先生文集 (Collection of literary works of Master Chang Shih) (Taipei: Kuang-wen 廣文 Book Co., reprint of 1669 ed.), 21:11a-b.

(30) For a discussion on this matter, see my *Chu-hsüeh lun-chi*, pp. 220-222.

(31) *Mien-chai chi* 勉齋集 (Collected works of Huang Kan) (*Ssu-k'u chen-pen* 四庫珍本 [Precious works of the Four Libraries] ed.), 36:41b-.

(32) *Chu Tzu wen chi*, 86:1a-12a.

(33) *Ibid.*, 86:7a-9a.

(34) Wang Mao-hung 王懋竑 (1693-1741), *Chu Tzu nien-p'u* 朱子年譜 (Chronological biography of Master Chu) (*Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng* 叢書集成 [Collection of series] ed.), pp. 220-221, 228.

(35) *Chu Tzu yü-lei*, ch. 107, sec. 27 (Taipei: Cheng-chung 正印 Book Co. ed., 1970, p. 42-46). I have reported on these and other aspects of Chu Hsi's religious practice in "Chu Hsi's Religious Life" *International Symposium on Chinese Western Cultural Interchange in Commemoration of the 400th Anniversary of the Arrival of Mateo Ricci, S. J., in China*, Taipei, 1983, pp. 51-76.

gathers professors of Neo-Confucian thought in eastern American colleges and universities once a month when a research paper by one of the members, which has been duplicated and distributed to all members, is discussed. Neo-Confucianism covers several dynasties, of course, but inevitably Chu Hsi plays a central role. In the past ten years or so, a number of promising scholars have written theses directly or indirectly on Chu Hsi. Those known to me are: David Gedalecia, *Wu Ch'eng* 吳澄: *a Neo-Confucian of the Yüan*, Harvard University, 1971; Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, *Values in History and Ethics in Politics: Issues Debated between Chu Hsi and Ch'en Liang* 陳亮, Harvard University, 1976; John Hugh Berthrong, *Glossary on Reality: Chu Hsi as Interpreted by Ch'en Ch'un*, The University of Chicago, 1979; Oaksook Chun Kin 金田玉淑, *Chu Hsi and Lu Hsiang-shan* 陸象山: *A Study of Philosophical Achievements and Controversy in Neo-Confucianism*, The University of Iowa, 1980; Timothy S. Phelan, *The Neo-Confucian Cosmology in Chu Hsi's "I-hsüeh ch'i-meng* 易學啓蒙" (A Primer for Studying the "Changes"), University of Washington, 1982; Chin-hsing Huang 黃進興, *The Lu-Wang School in the Ch'ing Dynasty: Li Mu-t'ang* 李穆堂, Harvard University, 1983; Joseph Alan Adler, *Divination and Philosophy: Chu Hsi's Understanding of the "I-ching* 易經", University of California Santa Barbara, 1984.

In the meantime, a number of conferences were held in various parts of the world on Neo-Confucianism in which Chu Hsi formed the central focus. In chronological order, these were the conference on Ming thought in Illinois in 1966, the conference on seventeenth-century Chinese thought in Italy in 1970, the one on Wang Yang-ming in Honolulu in 1972, the conference on practical learning in Chinese and Japanese Neo-Confucianism in Honolulu in 1974, the conference on Ch'ing (1644-1911) thought in California in 1977, the conference on Yüan (1277-1368) thought in Seattle in 1978, and the one on Korean thought in Italy in 1891. Most of these conferences were organized by Professor de Bary and supported by the American Council of Learned Societies. The up-shot was the International Conference on Chu Hsi in Honolulu in 1982 which I initiated and directed. Many authorities on Chu Hsi or Neo-Confucianism of the world, including Fung Yu-lan 馮友蘭, were assembled, thirty-six in all, besides thirty-three younger scholars as fellows, including the authors of theses just mentioned. A sequel to that conference is the one on Sung education directed by Dr. de Bary in Princeton in 1984, which grew out of the workshop on Chu Hsi and education at the Chu Hsi conference.

With all these activities surrounding this eminent thinker, it is safe to say that Chu Hsi is the center of interest in the American study of Chinese thought. Let me conclude by quickly pinpointing several tendencies in this study. The first is the shift from Europe to America as the center for Chu Hsi studies. From the early eighteenth-century Catholic fathers who debated on Chu Hsi's idea of God to James Legge (1815-1897) who translated the Four Books and other Classics, and from J.P. Bruce who wrote on Chu Hsi's Masters and translated some of his

works⁽³⁶⁾ to Father Graf who wrote on Tao and *jen*,⁽³⁷⁾ the scene or personnel were European. In our present day the outstanding person is Professor Josepo Needham of Cambridge University⁽³⁸⁾ and the strong research undertaking was the Sung Project in Paris.⁽³⁹⁾ But it was impossible to find a European authority on Chu Hsi for the Chu Hsi conference. The scene had shifted to America.

The second tendency is the increasing use of Chinese materials. American scholars had been consulting the *Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an*, etc., besides Chu Hsi's own works, but they had hardly utilized secondary Chinese sources. Only in the last several years has Ch'ien Mu's 錢穆 epoch-making work, *Chu Tzu hsin hsüeh-an* 朱子新學案 (New anthology and critical accounts of Master Chu), began to be used, and the works of T'ang Chun-i 唐君毅 (1909-1978) and Mou Tsung-san 牟宗三, two brilliant and important writers on Neo-Confucian thought, are hardly mentioned at all. American scholars, professors and students alike, prefer to use Japanese secondary materials. This is both natural and advisable, for Japanese texts are often punctuated, there are more study aids like indexes and dictionaries in Japan, there are more research facilities there, and one can find more financial aid to go there. The point is not that of commission, but rather that of omission. They are missing a lot by not using Chinese secondary materials. Fortunately the tide is turning, what with more frequent travel to Taiwan and Mainland China and books from those areas more easily available.

The third tendency is the greater use of firsthand source material. American scholarship on Chinese thought has reached the point that even the *Sung-Yüan hsüeh-an* or the *Chu Tzu hsin hsüeh-an* may be used as an aid but not as a replacement of the source material. Graduate students' knowledge of the Chinese language has advanced tremendously since World War II, and they can handle Chinese texts efficiently though still slowly. They are reading original sources seriously, including an effort to annotate them and consult commentaries. The day that only a person whose native tongue in Chinese can handle research on Chu Hsi is over; it is the training in research discipline that counts.

The fourth tendency has to do with Chinese scholars in America. There was a time when only Chinese scholars teaching Chinese philosophy in the United States could speak for Chinese philosophy, but there are quite a number of non-Chinese specialists on Neo-Confucianism, as their presence in international conferences on Chinese thought will testify. Chinese scholars on Chu Hsi still outnumber

(36) *Philosophy of Human Nature by Chu Hsi* (London: Probsthain & Co., 1922), *Chu Hsi and His Masters* (London: Probsthain & Co., 1923).

(37) Olaf Graf, *Tao und Jen: Sein und Sollen im Sungchinesischen Monismus* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970).

(38) *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 2, *History of Scientific Thought* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1956).

(39) *Sung Biographies*, ed. by Herbert Franke (Wiesbaden, Germany: Fanz Steiner Verlag, 4 vols., 1976); *A Sung Bibliography*, initiated by Etienne Balaze and ed. by Yves Hervonnet (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1978).

non-Chinese scholars, proportionately speaking, but they no longer have the monopoly. I might add that Chinese scholars in America have done remarkably well, so far as Neo-Confucianism is concerned; they have never been discriminated against; they have been favored with an equal, if not a greater, number of fellowships and honors; they have enjoyed a proportionate share of opportunity to serve in academic organizations and programs; and they have participated in greater number in international conferences on Neo-Confucian thought. It will be a long time before teaching and research conditions will develop in Taiwan and the Mainland to the level of Japan. Still one can look forward to the fact, that there will be more Chinese scholars than Japanese scholars in the United States for some years to come.

The fifth tendency is the broadening of Chu Hsi studies. Because of the traditional American interest in social sciences, American studies of Chu Hsi is tending to include such subjects as education, civil service examinations, local administration, women and children, etc., and no longer confined to such basic topics as the Great Ultimate, principle, and material force. The vista in Chu Hsi studies is definitely widening. What is more, such subjects are being pursued by concentrating on one area, utilizing local records and gazetteers, which are perhaps more easily available in libraries at Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, etc., than even in Taipei or Beijing. What needs to be developed is a proper historical or geographical perspective that requires an adequate understanding of Chinese culture and history.

Along with the tendency to broaden the vista is the sixth tendency, namely, objectivity. I do not mean to suggest that studies of Chu Hsi in China, Korea, or Japan are biased. There are many independent and objective scholars there, but they have to avoid the partisan spirit (*men-hu chih chien* 門戶之見) that has inhibited the development of Neo-Confucian thought for centuries. The Ch'eng-Chu School, that is, the School of Ch'ong I and Chu Hsi, has been pitted against the Lu-Wang School, that is, the School of Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming, for many hundred years, as if the former exclusively "follows the path of inquiry and study" while the latter exclusively "honors the moral nature,"⁽⁴⁰⁾ and the two schools have been called in recent decades the School of Principle (*li-hsüeh* 理學) and the School of Mind (*hsin-hsüeh* 心學), respectively. These are misnomer to me, for both schools are based on the doctrine of *li*, except Ch'eng and Chu asserted that the nature is principle while Lu and Wang declared that the mind is principle. Even then, neither school exclusively advocated either following the path of inquiry and study or honoring the moral nature. Certainly Chu Hsi regarded honoring the moral nature and following the path of inquiry and study as merely one thing.⁽⁴¹⁾ The bias has been ingrained for so long that few writers

(40) The two phrases come from the *Doctrine of the Mean*, ch. 27.

(41) *Chu Tzu yü-lei*, ch. 64, sec. 152 (p. 2524).

were free from it. Only recent scholars like Ch'ien Mu and T'ang Chun-i began to see the similarities between the two schools. American scholars are free from this tradition. In addition, they have been trained in objectivity. It may not be too extravagant to hope that American studies of Chu Hsi will lead to a new and impartial appraisal of him.

The final tendency to be mentioned is the comparative approach. Since most American universities offer Chinese, Korean, and Japanese studies in an East Asian department, it is natural that the faculties and resources of the three areas are brought together in the study of Chu Hsi. Thus a new dimension is added. Not that a comparative approach is absent in the Asian countries. Most American graduate students studying Chu Hsi are required to know two Asian languages, a goal yet to be achieved in China and Korea, and probably even Japan. The conferences referred to earlier, being international, have been comparative in character. There are more and more international conferences in the Asian countries themselves. Thus Chu Hsi will be studied from all levels and all angles. If I were Chu Hsi, I would be very much pleased. I am certainly pleased with my almost fifty years of teaching in the United States.

海外講授中國哲學五十年

陳 榮 捷

在美講授期間，曾歷四時期。一為介紹中國思想，二為翻譯經籍，三為討論中國哲學範疇，四為研討朱子。西人素以儒愛有差等為銀律，不若基督教之愛人如己為金律。殊不知張子西銘理一而分殊。四海皆兄弟，而愛由親始。西人又謂儒家不信人格神。其實孔子篤信天命，朱子極是虔誠，只是天與上帝大同而小異耳。五六十年代，翻譯老子壇經大學中庸傳習錄近思錄，不特使西方學者有第一手材料，而亦提高翻譯標準，蓋有詞必釋，有引句必溯其源，四德六藝等必詳舉其目，人名地名必加註釋。尤重要者，不特多多參考各家注疏，如論語採漢之鄭玄，宋之朱熹，與清之劉寶楠，不偏一家，而譯文間以評語，如老子「道生一，一生二，二生三」，竟為以後宇宙論之典型是也。範疇方面，除為哲學辭典與中國哲學辭典大全提供十餘萬言外，又譯陳淳之北漢字義。並指出大學為我國第一本範疇之書。繼以淮南子，說苑，論衡，通書，近思錄，孟子字義疏證，各有各之範疇。最有意義者為朱子所用範疇，皆非自創，而每有新義，如仁釋為「心之德愛之理」與禮為「天理之節文」是也。二十年前曾為法國巴黎大學「宋學研究」寫「朱子對新儒學之完成。」其時談朱子者竟無一人。近五年間，則論文專書，相繼而出。予於是有「廿載孤鳴沙漠中，而今理學忽然紅」之嘆。予十餘年來，專研朱子。臺北出版者已有「朱學論集」「朱子門人」兩書。香港中文大學「錢穆講座」之「朱子生平與思想」（英文）亦將脫梓。臺北又有「朱子新論」，專言數百年來中韓日學者所未言者，不久可以問世。予且將以英文發表。近者海內外朱學方興。予為過河小卒，可共同努力前進也。